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 " We may consider mankind
, therefore, as a band of bold though diminutive giants, 
gradually descending from the mountains to subjugate the earth, and change climates 
with their feeble arms. How far they are capable of going in this respect futurity will 
show" -Johann Gottfried von Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the History 
of Mankind 
 Every year some 17 million hectares of forest are cleared from the face of the globe. 
Cynics suggest that a large share of these end up being turned into books about the en-
vironment. Certainly, a visit to any bookshop will confirm that few recent issues have 
seized the public imagination as powerfully as the environmental crisis. Growing inter-
national consciousness of environmental issues has been accompanied, not only by in-
creasing debate on the crisis, but also by a widening of the intellectual boundaries of 
that debate. While the earliest warnings of environmental catastrophe came largely 
from ecologists, demographers and other scientific experts, the environment is now 
the domain of the historian, the economist, and the philosopher, as well, of course, as 
the lawyer and the politician. 
 Environmental ideas, in other words, have become a central part of contemporary 
thought, and are therefore worth very careful examination in their own right. This 
paper is an attempt to consider two approaches to environmental issues which seem to 
be particularly influential at present. The first might be called the "traditional culture" 
approach: that is, the view that the environmental crisis is a product of the culture and 
values of modern industrial society, and that solutions are to be found in the recovery 
of the lost values of traditional or pre-industrial society. The second approach is the 
concept of "sustainable development". 
  In many ways, these two approaches stand at opposite poles of environmental 
thought. The first inhabits the realms of philosophy, history and anthropology; the se-
cond deals in the currency of economics and politics. The first looks back in time and 
the second forward. The first emphasises the uniqueness of particular cultures; the se-
cond looks for international solutions to a global problem. By considering them 
together, however, it may be possible to draw out some common concerns and some 
topics for future disccussion. Because Japan is emerging as a world leader in interna-
tional environmental issues, I shall try to relate these ideas particularly to their 
Japanese context, but also to draw some links between debates in Japan and in other
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parts of the world.
"T
raditional Culture" and the Environment 
  Contemporary society, it seems is facing a crisis of culture as well as a crisis of 
nature. The worldwide spread of modern technology, while threatening the ecological 
balance, is also resulting in a sort of fission of the atom of culture. Revolutions in 
transport and communications have made the cultural distance between (let us say) 
New York and Bangkok in many ways smaller than the distance between Bangkok 
and the villages of northern Thailand. People who share views on marriage and 
childrearing with their parents and neighbours, therefore, may now share their taste in 
clothes with people of the same generation on the opposite side of the globe. 
 The fission of the atom of culture has positive and liberating aspects, but it also 
undermines old certainties, threatens established relationships and often creates fear 
and uncertainty in the minds of those most affected by change. One reaction to this 
uncertainty is an attempt to put the fragments back together again: to reassert the in-
divisibility and the authority of ethnic or national culture. In the process, however, 
the fragments to be reassembled are always selected with contemporary problems in 
mind: "traditional culture" comes to be reconstructed in a modern mould. 
 In the face of this dual crisis of nature and of culture it is hardly surprising that 
"t
raditional culture" should come to be seen, not only as the key to re-establishing 
fragmented social identity, but also as a key to restoring the lost balance between 
human beings and nature. Debates about the historical relationship between nature 
and national culture are nothing new, although for many decades the more powerful 
stream of thought, running from Herder through William Henry Buckle to writers 
like the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro, has been one which emphasised the im-
pact of nature on the shaping of human culture rather than vice versa.' The emergence 
of the first wave of environmentalism in the late-1960s, however, gave a new twist to 
these debates, so that the main topic of interest came to be the power of culture to 
remake nature in its own image. At this time, a number of scholars in Western Europe 
and the United States began to link the pillaging of nature to values which they saw as 
being inherent to the modern western tradition, as it had evolved from Christian 
thought through the intellectual revolutions of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. 
These traditions, they suggested, could be contrasted with a more harmonious relation-
1 See Johann Gottfired von Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, (Trans T. 
  O. Churchill) Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1968, ch. 1; H. T. Buckle, History of 
  Civilzation in England, London, Longman Green, 1903; in prewar Japan, Watsuji Tetsuro argued that 
  Japan's combination of warm monsoonal summers and cold winters had encouraged the development 
  of a special relationship with nature which transcended both the passive attitude of tropical monsoon-
  belt countries and the agressive approach of the cold north. See Watsuji Tetsuro, Fudo (1929) chs. 3-4, 
  reprinted in Kindai Nihon shiso taikei vol. 25, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 1974, particularly pp. 207-09; 
  even in these works, though, there is some recognition of the dialectical nature of the relationship bet-
  ween humans and their environment. Herder observes (in the quotation at the start of this paper) that 
  that human beings have changed climates, and that "the living creation has adapted itself to the ar-
  tificial climate." Herder op. cit. p. 19.
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ship between humans and nature, which they identified with the civilizations of Asia.2 
 In the past two decades, similar ideas have been enthusiastically elaborated by 
Japanese scholars. The well-known historian of science Watanabe Masao, for exam-
ple, has described Japan's traditional attitude to nature as being one in which human 
beings "see themselves as the companions of nature, and seek to immerse themselves 
in nature and become one with it."' Others have gone further than this, suggesting 
that the Japanese vision of the cosmos may have a special part to play in solving con-
temporary environmental problems, and indeed in curing other ills of modern civiliza-
tion.4 
 The writers who take this view explain the origins of the Japanese concept of nature 
in a number of ways. Some link it to the enduring influence of Shintoism, which has 
no concept of a transcendent god, but rather a sense of the spirit present in all natural 
things, from rocks and waterfalls to human beings;5 others emphasise the importance 
of Buddhism. Some seem to relate it to the more recent historical development of 
Japanese agriculture; others trace it back to the pre-agrarian Jomon period, or even to 
the very origins of Japan itself.6 
 In general, though, these analyses of the place of nature in traditional Japan have 
several common features. They see the sense of oneness with nature as being the result 
of adaption to a unique environment, and they link the Japanese value system to the 
preservation of that environment, particularly of natural riches like the forests. They 
also often illustrate the Japan concept of nature by referring to all the wealth of ar-
tistic activities - haiku poetry, brush painting, flower arranging etc. - which celebrate 
the beauty of natural forms.' 
 Not all scholars, it should be said, accept this characterisation of traditional 
Japanese culture. The pioneering historian of Japanese technology Saigusa Hiroto, 
for example, made an interesting distinction when he observed that Japanese art ex-
pressed a love for nature, but that this was always for "a nature which has been 
adapted by humans so that it can fit beautifully into the human world"; in short, a 
"humanised nature" (ningenteki shizen).8 More recent work by historians like Ando 
Seiichi also points to the diversity of human interaction with nature in pre-industrial 
Japan. While craft industries in seventeenth and eighteenth century Japan certainly 
showed sensitivity and parsimony in the use of natural resources, some technological 
practices, like the mining of alluvial iron sands, caused such severe environmental
2 For example, Lynn White Jr., "The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis", Science, no. 155, 1967, 
  pp. 1203-07; Edward A. Olson, "Man and Nature: East Asia and the West", Asian Profile, nos. 3 & 6, 
  1975. 
3 Watanabe Masao, Nihonjin to kindai kagaku, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1976, p. 174. 
4 For example, Umehara Takeshi, `Mori no shiso' wa jinrui o sukuu, Tokyo, Shogakukan, 1991, pp. 
  137-79. 
5 For example, Yasuda Yoshinori, "Animism Renaissance", Nichibunken Newsletter, 5, 1990, pp. 2-4. 
6 See "Teidan: Mori to dobutsu to bunmei", Bunmei to kankyd no. 2, August 1991, particularly pp. 
  14-16. 
7 For example, Umehara op. cit. pp. 204-05; Yasuda, "Animism Renaissance". 
8 Saigusa Hiroto, Gijutsu shi, Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shimposha 1940, pp. 14-15.
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disruption that they provoked riots by local farmers.' 
  Ideas about the environment seem to be similarly diverse. By the eighteenth century 
some merchants and farmers, as well as philosophers, were beginning to speak in 
terms which have distinct overtones of modern developmentalism. One popular text 
on silk farming, written by a well educated farmer around 1810 contains a debate bet-
ween the author and an imaginary questioner, who wishes to know whether wealth is a 
gift of nature or the fruit of human ingenuity. The answer involves an edifying story 
about the entrepreneurship of two successful silk merchants, ending with this une-
quivocal moral: "commodities are not produced in accordance with the natural en-
vironment of the country. Undoubtedly, they are brought forth by people with a 
talent for economic management."10 Ando, in his recent study, suggests that even 
philosophers like Kumazawa Banzan (1619-91), who emphasised the need to respect 
the fragile web of ecological relationships, may have done so not just because of their 
own sense of harmony with the natural order, but also because they saw that order be-
ing threatened by the spread of the commercial economy." 
  Writings on the environmental crisis often stress the need to overcome the dualistic 
concept of humans versus nature. In the present context, however, it is equally impor-
tant to avoid a simplistic dualism of "east" (or "Japan") versus "west". It is therefore 
important to recognize that Japanese debates on traditional attitudes to nature have 
recently been echoed by debates in other parts of the world. One intriguing example is 
the case of Russia, where that potent mixture of environmental concerns and na-
tionalism which I have elsewhere termed "econationalism" lies at the heart of debates 
on post-Communist ideology. After Chernobyl and other environmental distasters, 
the challenge to Communism came to be based in part on the accusation that it had 
destroyed the harmonious relationship to nature built up through centuries of Russian 
peasant culture. The rediscovery and celebration of that culture is therefore an impor-
tant theme in contemporary Russian thought, and is expressed in terms which are very 
reminiscent of some Japanese writings on traditional culture. 
 An influential article by anthropologist Kseniya Myalo, for example, argues that the 
pre-modern Russian village possessed a "cosmocentric" world view in which human ac-
tivity harmonized with the order of nature. Although the peasantry was not averse to 
change, social and technological innovation was always fitted into "a model of the 
ideal balance of the whole. " It is only in our present age "the era of global destruction 
of the ecological equilibrium and of the hole in the ozone layer," she writes, that we 
have come to appreciate the intuitive wisdom of village society. 12 In the same vein, the 
novellist Dmitri Balashov has claimed that, through centuries of adaptation to their
9 Ando Seiichi, Kinsei kogai shi no kenkyu, Tokyo, Furukawa Kobunkan, 1992, pp. 194-243. 
10 Narita Jubei, Sanshi kinuburui taisei, in Nihon nosho zenshu, vol. 35, Tokyo, Nosan Gyoson Bunka 
   kyokai, 1976, p. 316. The words "no fudo" are not included in the text, but are clearly implied, since 
   the statement is an answer to the question "meisan wa kuni no fudo ni yotte sanzuru ka. Mata keizai no 
   hito ni yotte izuru ka." (Are famous products created by the natural environment of the country, or are 
   they the product of people skilled in economic management?) 
I1 Ibid, pp. 365-79.
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harsh environment, the Russian people developed a unique culture based on a system 
of agriculture which harmonised with nature. This culture, however, was eroded, first 
by the westernising policies of Peter the Great and later Tsars, and then by the Com-
munists' obsessive drive towards industrialisation. For Balashov, the solution lies in 
the "restoration of national culture and national ethical norms," an important part of 
which is the restoration of the authority of the Orthodox church.13 
 These views in turn have echoes in a number of recent popular books which seek 
solutions to the contemporary crisis in the wisdom of tribal minorities in various part 
of the world. The best known is probably The Wisdom of the Elders, by Canadian 
ecologists Peter Knudtson and David Suzuki, which tries to distill some essential 
features of all "native" cultures, and to show "the power and relevance of their 
knowledge and worldview in a time of imminent global catastrophe. "14 The crucial 
features of the "Native mind", they suggest, include a profound awareness of the inter-
connectedness of all living things, an understanding of and respect for the powers of 
our fellow creatures, and a sense of sacred attachment to the land.
The Lessions of "Traditional Cultures": Uses and Limitations 
 The story told by books like The Wisdom of the Elders is an attractive one, but I 
cannot help having some doubts about its value as a source of solutions to contem-
porary environmental crisis. On the positive side, the study of non-industrial societies 
(ancient and modern) can certainly give us new perspectives on the problems of the in-
dustrial system and its relationship to nature. Seeing dominant modern concepts of 
nature in a comparative context, we are better able to criticise the weaknesses of those 
concepts and to imagine alternatives. 
 The "rediscovery" of indigenous cultures is also encouraging new research on surviv-
ing hunter gatherer societies, including the Ainu in Japan and Aboriginal societies in 
Australia. This research has both intellectual and political importance. There is an ob-
vious contradiction in seeking to learn from the culture of indigenous people while at 
the same time perpetuating centuries of dispossession. So the rediscovery of native 
culture is inseparably bound up, in Japan, Australia and elsewhere with the call for 
land rights which can, in the words of one Ainu leader "give us back the rights to live 
with nature."" 
  In spite of these important contributions, though, efforts to find a solution to en-
vironmental crisis in traditional or indigenous cultures have certain inherent pro-
blems. If we treat "traditional" societies as a source book for answers to modern ques-
tions, there is a temptation to focus only on their harmony with nature, and to avoid
12 Kseniya Myalo, "Oborvannaya Nit': Krest'yanskaya Kul'tura i Kul'turnaya Revolyutsiya" Novyi Mir, 
   August 1988, pp. 245-57, quotation from p. 253. For a discussion of Myalo's article, see V. Krasnov, 
   Russia Beyond Communism: A Chronical of National Rebirth, Boulder, Westview Press, 1991, pp. 
   116-17. 
13 Quoted in Krasnov op. cit., p. 161. 
14 P. Knudtson and D. Suzuki, The Wisdom of the Elders, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992, p. xxxv. 
15 Kayano Shigeru, "Give us Back the Rights to Live with Nature!", Ampo, vol. 20 no. 4 & vol. 21 no. 1, 
   1989, pp. 18-20.
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evidence of more complex or conflictual relationships with the natural world. But the 
Wisdom of the Elders was accumulated from many centries of experience, which 
presumably involved both trial and error. As we grope for a deeper historical 
understanding of the human relationship with nature, it may be more helpful to 
recognise these tensions and problems in "traditional" societies than to pursue the 
quest for the perfect paragon of ecological harmony. 
  There are two even more important problems with the "traditional culture" ap-
proach which I should like to single out for discussion. One is its role as a form of 
"
post modern" thought-that is, solution to the environmental and other ills of 
modern industrial societies. The difficulty in presenting "traditional culture" as means 
of solving contemporary problems is that it does not seem to offer any clear path to 
practical action, at least for those of us who live in the rich nations of the industrial 
world. Once we have marvelled at the cosmocentric philosophy of the Russian pea-
sant, the Zen monk or the Kung herdsman, where do go from there? Can we select the 
view of nature embodied in one of these non-industrial cultures and make it our own? 
I suspect not; for concepts of nature are not free-floating entities which can be detatch-
ed from one social setting and transfered to another. Instead, they are bounded and 
given meaning by other notions -about the relationship between one human being 
and another, about the ownership or sharing of material goods, about the limits of 
space and the flow of time. And these concpets in turn are moulded and strengthened 
by day to day experience of work and play. Indigenous cultures, or the cultures of past 
societies, may teach us the details of their technology, but it is difficult to see how we 
can adopt their attitude to nature without some fundamental re-ordering of contem-
porary society. 
 The second problem has to do with the question of diversity. Efforts to define a 
single indigenous or traditional view of nature can lose sight of the differences within 
and between non-industrial societies. It is of course possible, in surveying cultural 
traditions of various non-industrial societies, to pick out certain recurrent themes: 
myths of creation, rituals of the hunt, symbols of identity with the land etc. But surely 
the most wonderful thing about past human societies, and about surviving indigenous 
cultures today, is their phenomenal variety of forms. Rather than selecting a par-
ticular society as a model of ecological wisdom, or seeking to extract common features 
from many traditional cultures, it may be more meaningful to concentrate on that 
diversity itself. The success of human beings as a species surely has a lot to do with the 
fact that, of all animals, we are capable of adopting the greatest variety of different 
lifestyles. Across the span of time and geographical space human societies have shown 
the ability to interact with nature in an extraordinary diversity of ways: they have 
eaten different foods, gathered and farmed different crops, made their clothes and 
buildings from different materials, used different tools, sung different songs and 
dreamed different dreams. For this reason they have been able to occupy an enormous 
range of different niches in the global ecosystem.
The Limits to Sustainable Development 
 These two issues-the issue of diversity and the issue of the relationship between
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values and practical action - are central to contemporary environmental dilemmas, 
and therefore also to dilemmas about the notion of "sustainable development". A ma-
jor cause of environmental crisis is, not so much economic growth itself, but the fact 
that for the first time in history we have a worldwide economy in which virtually all 
countries are pursuing the same model of growth, using similar productive techniques 
and therefore consuming the same natural resources and pouring the same pollutants 
into an overloaded ecological system. This worldwide uniformity is reinforced, not on-
ly by the complex interconnectedness of modern technologies, but also by the rules of 
the international economic game. 
 Since the Second World War, this game has been based on a continual tension bet-
ween the logic of the nation state and the logic of the global economy. International 
organisations like the IMF and GATT have striven to maintain an open trading 
system, allowing the free worldwide movement of goods and capital (but not people) 
while national governments have struggled to balance the demands of their domestic 
constituency with the demands of the international rule-makers. This balancing act 
creates a short-term perspective where governments are constantly concerned with 
riding out the current crisis. The rules of the international game foreclose certain op-
tions for nation states. Policies which isolate parts of the economy from international 
influences, for example, are contrary to the ethos of the IMF and GATT. 
  Given the pressures under which they operate, the simplest path for governments to 
pursue is one which encourages the inflow of foreign investment and the expansion of 
exports. Rather than undertaking the arduous long-term process of developing locally 
appropriate technologies, governments are always under pressure to pursue im-
mediate solutions based on the standardised economic policies of the IMF and World 
Bank, and on the import and diffusion of standardised global technologies. The rules 
designed to maintain an open world trading system and resolve balance of payments 
problems have thus encouraged the world economy to develop, as it were, a massive 
balance of payments deficit with nature. 
 Practical efforts to deal with this dilemma have come to be underpinned by the con-
cept of "sustainable development", which slipped quietly into popular discourse in the 
early-1980s.16 The popularity of this notion has grown pari pasu with the growing in-
fluence of the "traditional culture" perspective which we have just discussed, but its 
assumptions and implications are in many ways very different. 
  It should be said that Japan has played a particularly important role in the evolu-
tion of debates on sustainability. During the 1970s, when the Japanese government 
began to respond to pressure from citizens' groups by introducing stringent curbs on 
industrial emissions, the focus of environment debate was largely domestic and was 
concentrated upon the problems of "pollution" (kogai), envisaged as direct harm to 
human health from industrial processes. During the late-1970s, concern about kogai 
expanded into a wider debates about the conservation of nature within Japan itself,
16 Kankyo Cho Chikyu Kankyo Keizai KenkyQ Kai, Chikyu kankyo no seiji keizai gaku, Tokyo, 
   Daiyamondo Sha, 1990, p. 47.
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but it was only in 1981 that the Environment Agency began to turn its attention to 
global matters, establishing the influential Ad Hoc Group on Global Environmental 
Problems (Chiky(lteki Kibo no Kankyo Mondai ni Kansuru Kondankal) under the 
chairmanship of former Foreign Minister Okita Saburo. On the advice of this ad-
visory group the Japanese government took the initiative in proposing the establish-
ment of the World Commission on Environment and Development (better known as 
the Brundtland Commission), whose final report - Our Common Future-is the most 
complete and significant statement on the concept of sustainable development.17 
Japan also, of course, was a key player in the Rio Earth Summit of May-June 1992, 
where it pledged over US$7 billion in environmental aid over the next five years, thus 
becoming, as it were, the chief official sponsor of the sustainable development pro-
cess. Unlike the "traditional culture" approach, the notion of sustainable develop-
ment is strong on practical proposals and political programs. It is impelled by a power-
ful sense of forward momentum. But it is also often ambiguous about its 
philosophical basis, and seems to contain two different visions of the future, whose 
tensions are not always acknowledged or reconciled. The first vision sees sustainable 
development as an agenda, a particular set of solutions to environmental problems 
which is to be imposed upon the world through international agreement. The second 
vision sees sustainable development on the contrary as a process: the process of en-
couraging different societies to develop their own solutions to their own particular pro-
blems. The first, in short, represents sustainability through standardisation and the se-
cond sustainability through diversity; the first is sustainability from above, the second 
sustainability from below. 
 Both versions of sustainable development recognise the problem of allowing less 
developed nations to pursue their hopes for industrialisation without provoking en-
vironmental catastrophe. The "top down" version of sustainability, though, argues 
that these issues can be resolved by encouraging the worldwide spread of a specific 
model of industrial development. At some point around the mid-1970s, it suggests, a 
fundamental change - a "de-materialisation" - transformed the nature of industrial 
technologies. 18 Since then, the trend has been towards knowledge intensive, material 
saving techniques -what are known in Japan as the kei-haku tan-sho or "light, thin, 
short and small" technologies. According to the Brundtland Commission, if in-
dustrialised countries "continue the recent shifts in the content of their growth 
towards less material- and energy-intensive activities and the improvement of their 
efficiency in using materials and energy," it should be possible to maintain reasonably 
high rates of worldwide growth with low levels of environmental impact.19 High 
growth in industrial countries can provide markets for the exports of less developed
17 See "Statement by H. E. Bunbei Hara, Representative of Japan, to the Session of a Special Character 
   of the Governing Council of the United National Environment Program, Nairobi, May 11, 1982", in 
   Kankyo Cho Chokan Kanbo Kokusai Ka, Nairobi Kaigi no kiroku, Tokyo, Kankyo Cho, 1982, p. 303: 
   Kankyo hakusho 1991, p. 84. 
18 World Commission for Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford 
   University Press, 1987, pp. 213-19.
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countries, helping them to move along the path towards industrialisation. But if, at 
the same time, these newly industrialising countries can be persuaded to incorporate 
the latest materials and energy saving know-how into their expanding offices and fac-
tories, their industrial revolutions will take place without the environmental disasters 
which have accompanied industrialisation in other parts of the world. 
 At this point in the argument, Japan is often held up as a model for emulation 
because of its remarkable success in shifting from heavy industry to the new informa-
tion intensive industries. The Brundtland Report, quoting figures from an article by 
Peter Drucker, notes that "Japan used only 60 per cent as much raw materials for 
every unit of production in 1984 as it used in 1973. "20 The head of Japan's environmen-
tal protection agency also points out the connection between strict environmental con-
trols in Japan and the successful development of new, materials saving technologies, 
and presents Japan's experience as evidence that "excellent environmental policies 
lead to technological development and beneficial economic activity. "21 This was re-
iterated at the Rio Earth Summit, where Japan's pledge of aid was presented in a 
speech which emphasised the relevance of Japan's recent industrial restructuring to 
less developed countries.22 
 The advantage of the top-down, standardised version of sustainablity is that it can 
easily be fitted into existing economic and political structures, and so offers a way of 
making a rapid impact on pressing ecological problems. Of course there may be 
resistance from individual nation states and private enterprises to the imposition of 
tighter environmental standards and the introduction of less polluting technologies. 
But the carrots and the sticks which are necessary to overcome resistance can generally 
be applied within the framework of existing systems - whether national economic 
plans, bilateral aid programs or multilateral agencies like the United Nations, World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. Many of the technologies needed to reduce 
resource consumption are already in existence in leading countries like Japan, and 
their transfer to industrialising nations requires no fundamental rethinking of official 
approaches to development. The period from 1975 to 1986, for example, has already 
seen a six-fold increase in Japan's exports of pollution control equipment, mainly to 
other Asian countries.23 The formula for sustainability, then, is "more rapid economic 
growth in both industrial and developing countries, freer market access for the pro-
ducts of developing countries, lower interest rates, greater technology transfer, and 
significantly larger capital flows, both concessional and commercial. "24 
 But the idea of internationalising a version of sustainability developed by advanced 
industrialised countries is open to several criticisms. For one thing, the "de-materialisa-
19 
20 
21
22 
23 
24
Ibid, p. 51. 
Ibid, p. 216. 
 "Jinrui kyodo no chosen: Chikyu kankyo mondai no arata na apurochi o motomete"
, in Kankyo CH 
Chikyu Kankyo Bu Kikaku Ka ed., Chikyu kankyo jidai, Tokyo, Gyosei, 1990, p. 74. 
Asahi Shimbun, 11 June 1992. 
Kankyo hakusho 1988, p. 98. 
World Commission for Environment and Development op. cit. p. 89.
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tion" of industry in the rich nations during the 1970s and 1980s was partly achieved by 
shifting more heavily resource-consuming and polluting industries off-shore. Newly-in-
dustrialising countries are on the receiving end of this transfer, and so in these coun-
tries, achieving a combination of industrial growth and reduced environmental impact 
will be much harder than it has been for countries like Japan. The resource-saving pro-
perties of the new "light, thin, short and small" technologies, too, may not be as great 
as they seem. As far as the exhaustion of non-renewable resources is concerned, what 
matters is not so much the total amount of raw material used in production, but the 
ratio of consumption to known reserves. New products like microelectronics may be 
"small and light" in terms of the absolute volume of material which goes into their 
manufacture, and still cause the rapid depletion of relatively rare minerals (such as tan-
talum and lithium) required in their production. 
 Besides, technologies which address the burning environmental issues of the day 
have a troublesome tendency to aggravate problems which have temporarily been 
banished from the headlines. One reason why Japan has been able to combine in-
dustrial growth with falling emissions of carbon dioxide, for example, is that Japanese 
industry has shifted from the use of thermal to nuclear power, which now supplies 
around 30% of Japan's electricity, as compared to about 10% in the late-1970s.25 In 
Japan and other industrialised countries some leading advocates of sustainable 
development explicitly look to nuclear power as a solution to the greenhouse effect. 
One advisor to the government's Ad Hoc Group on Global Environmental Problems, 
for example, argues that "the time is coming for a fair assessment of the role of 
nuclear generation in energy supply... The main reason for this is the global en-
vironmental problem ...I believe that, as far as the choice of energy sources is concern-
ed, we must consider nuclear power as an effective means for dealing with the carbon 
dioxide problem. "26 Industrialising nations like Indonesia are now devising large-scale 
plans for nuclear power generation as part of their future development strategies. It is 
not necessary to reherse the debates about nuclear energy in order to make the point 
that this may be a leap from the frying pan into the fire. 
 The most interesting point about this top-down, standardised version of sustainable 
development, however, is its stark contradiction to the "traditional culture" ap-
proaches which we looked at earlier. At the level of contemporary ideas there seems to 
be a passionate search for alternatives to the values of industrial civilization, but at the 
level of practical action, global environmental policies are locking us more firmly than 
ever into the industrial ethos of rapid growth, international standardisation and 
sophisticated technological fixes. This paradox was in a sense epitomised at the Rio 
Summit, where official commitments to the transfer of technology and the promotion 
of worldwide growth were accompanied by a speech in which former Prime Minister 
Takeshita called for the creation of a chikyu furusato - a term which could literally be 
translated as "global village", but has strong overtones of return to one's native, rural
25 See UN Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1979 and 1989. 
26 Quoted in Gijutsu to ningen, vol. 18, no. 3, March 1989, p. 34.
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roots.27 
 The architects of sustainable development seem to be aware of the contradictions, 
because amongst the recommendations for more aid, trade and foreign investment, 
there are signs of a different version of sustainability trying to get out. Our Common 
Future, for example, while calling for large-scale transfers of technology through con-
ventional methods such as foreign investment and aid, also recognises that "the 
technologies of industrial countries are not always suited or easily adaptable to the 
socio-economic and environmental conditions of developing countries." It therefore 
emphasises importance of "enhancing research, design, development and extension 
facilities in the Third World, "28 and suggests that social and environmental needs can 
best be reconciled by "decentralising the management of resources upon which local 
communities depend... promoting citizen's initiatives, empowering people's organiza-
tions, and strengthening local democracy. "29 Agenda 21's program of international 
regulation, standardised data collection, and large-scale flows of development 
assistance through existing bilateral and multilateral channels, too, sits rather oddly 
beside its calls for "the generation and application of...indigenous and local 
knowledge.. .to achieve sustained levels of development" and recommendations on the 
involvement of local expertise in developing "national and regional pathways to sus-
tainable development. "30 
 Statements like these seem to suggest a vision of the future which is at odds both 
with the idea of restoring "traditional" values and with the idea of sustainability 
through the worldwide application of a single development model. They suggest a vi-
sion of sustainability whose aim to rediscover technological and social diversity. This 
is not, however, a diversity which relies on the maintenance or re-imposition of "tradi-
tion", but a diversity which could grow out of contempoary choices made by com-
munities on priorities and techniques for development. The aim seems to be a process 
of improving living standards where all societies would not adopt the same production 
technologies and the same organisational systems, but where development could in-
volve the emergence and evolution of variety of different technological models, each 
of which would sustain its own style of work, play and social organisation. They 
point, in other words, to a different approach to transcending the problems of 
"
modernity" . 
  But the pursuit of this version of sustainability would imply practical policies very 
different from the ones which have emerged from so far from events like the Rio Sum-
27 
28 
29 
30
Asahi Shimbun, 5 June 1992. 
World Commission for Environment and Development op. cit. p. 60. 
Ibid, p. 63. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Geneva, 1992, ch. 35 pp. 3 
and 5; a similar tension is evident in Japanese government White Papers on the environment, where 
statements on the need for Japan to exert tighter control over aid payments, rather than relying on a 
"
request-based" system, sit side by side with statements on the need for more "appropriate 
technologies" and more grass-roots cooperation between local organisations in Japan and developing 
countries. See Kankyo hakusho 1988, pp. 112-17.
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mit. It implies, for example, that less developed countries might learn, not so much 
from Japan's industrial strategies in the 1970s and 1980s as from other aspects of 
Japan's past, such as its rather rich experience in adapting and modifying techniques 
to suit local needs. Work by historians like Nakaoka Tetsuro has shown the very im-
portant role which intermediate technologies played in Japan's early industrialisation.31 
The eminent environmentalist Ui Jun points out that these successes were often the 
result, not of central government policy, but of the efforts of local communities and 
local government.32 In my own research on the history of Japanese technology, I have 
been struck by the number and diversity of Japan's locally-based industrial research 
laboratories, of which there are now more than 120, the oldest of them dating back to 
1873.33 Although the role of these laboratories has changed over time as they have 
become integrated into national strategies for high technology, many have a history of 
developing their own distinctive techniques, working closely with local industrial com-
munities whose origins may go back to the eighteenth century or beyond. These bodies 
could provide the basis for a policy of technological cooperation which would not 
simply transfer know-how to other countries, but would share with foreign counter-
parts the experiences of fitting innovation to local needs. 
 This sort of "grass-roots cooperation", though, will always be marginal unless it is 
linked to the much wider and more difficult reforms which would create space for the 
local control of resources and techniques. A central part of these reforms would need 
to be a radical rethinking of the structure and goals of international organisations like 
the IMF and World Bank: a point acknowledged by Our Common Future34 but not 
followed up the environmental agreements emerging from the Rio Summit. Several re-
cent studies of environmental and development issues have suggested, for example, 
that international economic agencies, when providing conditional loans, might set 
development targets for recipient countries, rather than prescribing the policies by 
which targets are to be achieved.35 Another vital aspect of reform would surely be a 
lengthening of the time horizons built into the policies of international agencies, so 
that governments would have scope to pursue long-term strategies rather than quick 
fixes. 
 It is interesting to observe that Japanese officials have also recently begun to call for 
a basic rethinking of the economic philosophies of the World Bank. The reforms 
which they have in mind, however, are not ones which would encourage environmen-
tally appropriate development strategies, but ones which would allow the state to play
31 Nakaoka Tetsuro, "Gijutsu shi no shiten kara mita Nihon no keiken", in Nakaoka Tetsuro et al. eds., 
   Kindai Nihon no gijutsu to gijutsu seisaku, Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986. 
32 Ui Jun, "Trends in Ecology in Japan Since the 17th Century", Okinawa Daigaku kiyo, no. 9, 1992, p. 
  32. 
33 Kagaku Gijutu Cho, Zenkoku shiken kenkyu kikan meikan 1989-1990, Tokyo, Kagaku Gijutsu Cho, 
  1989. 
34 World Commission for Environment and Development op. cit. p. 337. 
35 For a discussion of this issue, see J. Clark, Democratising Development, London, Earthscan Publica-
   tions, 1991, pp. 218-19.
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greater role in forcing the pace of industrial growth.36 If these efforts were directed in-
stead to reforms which would sustain a variety of environmentally appropriate 
development models, it might be possible for Japan to play a more fundamental role 
in promoting long-term sustainability. 
 There is another key issue in the "bottom up" vision of sustainability which needs 
special emphasis: the issue of the ownership of property. This is a very unfashionable 
subject at present. Talk of redistributing property seems automatically to conjour up 
discredited hard-line Marxist ideologies. But the question of property is vital to en-
vironmental solutions for a rather simple reason. Private corporations, by their very 
nature, have to grow. They exist in order to make profits and in order to enhance their 
own competitive power by expansion. If, however, the people who use resources own 
those resources, there is no necessary commitment to growth or profit. Farmers who 
own their own plot of land can choose to use it in order to increase their material 
wealth, but may instead, at a certain level of prosperity, decide to choose greater 
leisure rather than greater material wealth. The option of choosing leisure is crucially 
important, because leisure allows us to enjoy the environment more fully, and also to 
take part more fully in those participatory democratic activities which are vital to truly 
sustainable development. 
 There is little hope of "empowering local groups" or developing regional pathways 
to sustainability without giving people a greater stake in the ownership of the 
resources which they use. Therefore large-scale transfers of wealth from north to 
south will only make sense if they are used, not for conventional multinational-
dominated development projects, but to enable local communities (and particularly 
the poorer members of those communities) to buy individual or group control of the 
resources which they use-in other words, to buy control of their own futures.
Conclusions: Towards a Rediscovery of Diversity 
 The purpose of this rather winding journey through space and time is to make two 
suggestions for future research. The first is a plea for greater integration of various 
levels of research on environmental issues. Although, as I suggested earlier, the en-
vironment has become an issue of debate in a growing number of disciplines, the pro-
posals coming out of different disciplines often seem to pass each other by without so 
much as a nod of recognition. So the search for new environmental values and new 
concepts of nature can become oddly detatched from the search for new legal 
frameworks, economic policies or international agreements to protect the environ-
ment; appeals for the rediscovery of tribal wisdom can coexist with policies to speed 
the worldwide spread of industrialisation. 
 The second suggestion is for a closer and more interdisciplinary look at the role of 
social diversity, as well as bio-diversity, in ensuring ecological survival. Conventional 
concepts of modernisation generally assumed that material progress would be accom-
panied by a growing convergence between different societies. "Modern" society was of
36 Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 June 1992, pp. 60-62.
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course a pluralistic society, allowing room for a variety of ideas and lifestyles, but it 
was still to bound together by an overarching system of shared values and uniform 
organisational structures, as well as by a single system of technological knowledge. 
Recently, this vision of progress has come to be challenged by various forms of 
"
postmodernisation" theory, and the search for an alternative has been given par-
ticular significance by environmental crisis. 
 One possible reaction is to maintain the unity of the system but to swap the growth 
model, rather as one might swap an old car for a newer, more fuel efficient version. 
Another is to try to reverse the process of modernity altogether, reimposing the lost na-
tional or ethnic traditions of pre-industrial society. A third, suggested by the alter-
native version of sustainability discussed in this paper, would imply a strengthening of 
local control over the processes of development, thus allowing material progress to 
become progress towards diversity. Whether the third approach is a feasible one is 
uncertain. But a closer look at its problems and possibilities might provide one way, 
not only of deepening international environmental cooperation, but also of crossing 
the mental frontiers which often separate the nuts-and-bolts study of legal regula-
tions, technology transfers, and aid packages from the more speculative search for 
new environmental values.
